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 Tax Issues in the Sharing Economy 
 Implications for Workers 
 Shu- Yi  Oei and  Diane M.   Ring 
 Introduction 
 The past several years have seen the rise of what is commonly referred to as the “sharing 
economy.” The term generally refers to the production or distribution of goods and services 
by individuals through a technological platform or “app.” 1 The platform seamlessly puts ser-
vice providers and producers in touch with consumers of goods and services, allowing indi-
viduals to easily monetize their assets or services, often (though not invariably) by exploiting 
excess capacity. The types of activity done through sharing platforms vary, but common 
examples include renting property via platforms such as Airbnb, driving for Transportation 
Network Companies (TNCs) such as Uber or Lyft, performing tasks through TaskRabbit 
or Rover, or selling goods through a website like Etsy. While the magnitude and growth of 
work done on these platforms in the US economy are hard to quantify, there is some indica-
tion that it is signifi cant. A recent Brookings study found – based on data on “nonemployer” 
fi rms in US census data – that such fi rms encompassed 24 million businesses in 2014, up 
from 15 million in 1997 and 22 million in 2007. 2 Moreover, such businesses are not limited 
to the US market. Many of the platforms that launched initially in the United States have 
expanded to other countries, and homegrown platforms have emerged in many foreign 
jurisdictions. 
 Regardless of specifi c numbers, what is clear is that a growing number of individuals now per-
form work in the sharing economy. This increase raises a number of tax and regulatory questions, 
including questions about the impact of sharing economy work on workers and service providers 
operating in this sector. One important set of questions confronting workers concerns how they 
are taxed, whether the tax system functions effectively with respect to this work, and relatedly, 
how such workers confront and ought to deal with tax compliance challenges. 
 1  The sector is also sometimes referred to as the “gig economy,” “platform economy,” or “peer- to- peer economy.” 
 See, e.g. , Elka Torpey and Andrew Hogan,  Working in a Gig Economy , U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (May 2016),  www.bls.gov/ careeroutlook/ 2016/ article/ what- is- the- gig- economy.htm ;  Shu- Yi  Oei ,  The Trouble 
with Gig Talk: Ambiguity, Choice of Narrative, and the Abetting Function of Law ,  81 Law & Contemp. Probs . 107 
( 2018 ) . In this chapter, we use the term “sharing economy” to refer to the sector. 
 2  Ian  Hathaway and  Mark  Muro ,  Tracking the Gig Economy: New Numbers ,  Brookings Institution (Oct. 13,  2016 ) , 
 www.brookings.edu/ research/ tracking- the- gig- economy- new- numbers/ . “Nonemployer” fi rms are fi rms with at least 
$1,000 of gross revenues but no employees. About 86 percent of nonemployer fi rms are sole proprietor independent 
contractors.  Id. at  note 5 . The authors note that not all of the growth in nonemployer fi rms is due to sharing economy 
work; it also refl ects the increased use of various investment vehicles.  Id. 
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 In this chapter, we survey some of the key tax issues that have confronted individuals oper-
ating in the sharing economy. While our discussion focuses on the United States, these classi-
fi cation, documentation, and compliance challenges frequently arise in other countries. Many 
of the tax implications of this work stem from the threshold decision by many platforms to 
classify such individuals as independent contractors rather than employees. Therefore, we fi rst 
discuss how the threshold classifi cation decision affects the substantive and compliance- related 
tax issues faced by individuals operating in the sharing economy. We briefl y summarize the 
doctrinal tax rules governing income taxation of sharing economy workers, discussing both 
the rules for income inclusion and the rules for expense tracking and taking. We then discuss 
some of the compliance challenges experienced by sharing economy participants in fulfi lling 
their tax obligations, including the need to allocate expenses between business and personal 
use, the need to fi le estimated taxes, liability for self- employment taxes, and the need to track 
income given imperfect information reporting. The chapter then examines tax- related factors 
(such as lack of withholding) that may affect the labor- supply decisions of sharing economy 
participants. For example, we examine the potential impacts of lack of withholding and of 
expense estimation diffi culties on how these individuals calculate their likely profi t or loss from 
engaging in such work. Finally, we discuss possible reforms to the taxation of sharing economy 
participation that may help alleviate compliance challenges associated with work in this sector 
or may help these individuals make more informed decisions, and we explore the downsides 
of such reforms. 
 Throughout our discussion, we draw upon our previous empirical and doctrinal work 
concerning participants in the sharing economy as well as on the scholarship of others. 3 
 This chapter focuses on tax law, but legal analysis of the sharing economy cannot be 
conducted exclusively on a fi eld- by- fi eld basis. Assessments and recommendations derived in 
one legal context can intentionally or unintentionally impact outcomes in other areas. This 
observation especially holds where the same issue, such as worker classifi cation, arises across 
legal regimes. Thus, for example, a policy recommendation on workers’ classifi cation for tax 
purposes may fi nd its impact extends beyond taxation to infl uence classifi cation of sharing 
workers in other legal regimes such as labor or tort law. 4 Just because a rule may produce an 
appropriate outcome in the tax system does not mean that the rule similarly generates favor-
able policy results in other cases. As a result, some measure of caution is warranted in under-
taking a predominantly fi eld- specifi c analysis; the actual implementation of policy can have 
a more expansive effect. 
 3  See, e.g. ,  Shu- Yi  Oei and  Diane M.  Ring ,  Can Sharing Be Taxed? ,  93  Wash. U. L. Rev.  989 ( 2016 ) [hereinafter 
 Can Sharing be Taxed? ];  Shu- Yi  Oei and  Diane M.  Ring ,  The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet 
Discussion Forums ,  8  Colum. J. Tax L.  56 ( 2017 ) [hereinafter  The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers ];  Michèle  Finck and 
 Sofi a  Ranchordás ,  Sharing and the City ,  49  Vand. J. Transnat’l L.  1299 ( 2017 ) ;  Kathleen DeLaney  Thomas ,  Taxing 
the Gig Economy ,  U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming,  2018 ) ,  https:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2894394 ; 
 Jordan M.  Barry and  Paul L.  Caron ,  Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy ,  81  Chi. 
L. Rev. Dialogue  69 ( 2015 ) ; Jordan Barry,  this volume ; Caroline Bruckner, Shortchanged: The Tax Compliance 
Challenges of Small Business Operators Driving the On- Demand Platform Economy, Kogod Tax Policy Center 
(May 2016),  https:// perma.cc/ Z9J4- M49G ; Miriam A. Cherry and Antonio Aloisi,  this volume ; Manoj Viswanathan, 
 this volume . 
 4  For example, recently proposed legislation in the Senate that purports to “clarify” the correctness of independent 
contractor classifi cation of gig workers for tax purposes is likely to cement independent contractor treatment in other 
areas of law by endowing such classifi cation with a default presumption of correctness.  See The New Economy Works 
to Guarantee Independence and Growth (NEW GIG) Act of 2017 , 115th Congress, 1st Session (S. 1549),  www.thune 
.senate.gov/ public/ _ cache/ fi les/ c9e8dda1- dbb6- 4a78- 8f2a- 88f39c14be1e/ D975731B1FE56963DD1D09F2CB8D78
CC.ott17387.pdf (proposed by Sen. John Thune, R- S.D.). 
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 I  The Threshold Question of Worker Classification 
 The tax consequences to a sharing economy worker depend in the fi rst instance on whether 
that individual is classifi ed as an independent contractor or an employee for tax purposes. 5 The 
worker classifi cation question is signifi cant for a number of different legal areas, including state 
and federal labor protections. 6 Indeed, though the nuances may differ, the worker classifi cation 
question has arisen in jurisdictions other than the United States and many of the basic tensions, 
concerns, and tradeoffs will resonate with other countries. 
 Resolution of the worker classifi cation question depends on the specifi c legal regime and 
the classifi cation test it employs. 7 Additionally, worker classifi cation may differ from platform to 
platform, depending on the precise relationship between worker and platform. It is also theor-
etically possible that two different workers operating on the same platform might be appropri-
ately placed in different classifi cations, depending on their job parameters. Classifi cation may 
be more material to TNC drivers and those performing services and tasks (e.g., on TaskRabbit) 
than to other sharing economy participants (such as those offering property for rent on Airbnb). 
In short, the worker classifi cation question is variable and complex. We summarize some of the 
main points, as they relate to tax, here. 
 If the worker is classifi ed as an independent contractor for tax purposes, the US tax law effect-
ively treats her as operating an independent small business as a sole proprietor. As a small business 
operator, she will therefore be responsible for paying self- employment taxes (social security and 
Medicare taxes) at a 15.3 percent rate by fi ling Schedule SE, but can deduct half these taxes on 
Form 1040, Line 27. 8 This contrasts with the tax treatment of employees: if a worker is classifi ed 
as an employee, the employer will be responsible for depositing and reporting payroll taxes, and 
the employer is nominally responsible for half the social security and Medicare taxes. 9 Thus, 
the employer must not only withhold the employee’s share of social security and Medicare 
taxes from employee wages but is also further responsible for paying an employer matching 
portion. 10 In theory, the same amount of employment tax would be paid to the government on 
behalf of a worker, and the worker would net the same after tax in either scenario (employee or 
independent contractor). This comparison anticipates that in shifting from employee status to 
independent contractor status, for example, the worker would be able to negotiate a pay increase 
equal to the amount of tax previously borne by the employer and now owed by the independent 
contractor (and deductible by that taxpayer in the process of calculating taxable income). Of 
course, it is possible that the economic incidence may fall on the worker in the form of lower 
wages. 11 
 There are four further key differences between the tax treatment of employees and inde-
pendent contractors. First, wages paid to employees are subject to income tax withholding 
by the platform- payor but amounts paid to independent contractors are not withheld but are 
merely subject to information reporting on Forms 1099, as described below. This means that 
  5  There are labor law and other consequences as well to the worker’s classifi cation but this chapter will focus on tax. 
  6  See, e.g. ,  V. B.  Dubal ,  Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities ,  105  Cal. 
L. Rev .  101 ( 2017 ) ;  Benjamin  Means and  Joseph  Seiner ,  Navigating the Uber Economy ,  49  U.C. Davis L. Rev.  1511 
( 2016 ) . These issues are discussed in more depth elsewhere in this volume.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippett; Brishen 
Rogers. 
  7  See, e.g., Shu- Yi Oei,  supra  note 1 . 
  8  I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b); I.R.C. § 164(f)(1);  Can Sharing be Taxed? ,  supra  note 3 , at 1019– 20. 
  9  I.R.S. Publ’n No. 15  (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide (2018). 
 10  Id. 
  11  See, e.g. ,  N. Gregory  Mankiw ,  Principles of Macroeconomics 124 (8th ed.,  2015 ) . 
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those operating as independent contractors might need to fi le and pay estimated taxes on a quar-
terly basis in order to make up for the lack of withholding, and may be subject to underpayment 
penalties if they fail to do so. 12 Second, the federal income tax deductions available to employees 
are more severely restricted than those available to independent contractors. Unreimbursed 
expenses of employees are classifi ed as “below the line deductions,” and their deductibility is 
subject to limitation based on the employee’s adjusted gross income. 13 Third, businesses that hire 
employees must pay federal unemployment insurance tax (FUTA tax). Independent contractors 
do not pay this tax and cannot seek unemployment benefi ts. 14 
 Finally, in December 2017, a new provision was enacted, Section 199A, that grants a deduction 
of up to 20 percent of “qualifi ed business income” to passthrough businesses (i.e. not corporations 
and not employees). Policy makers, taxpayers, and tax advisers are just beginning to assess the 
potential impact of this new deduction. With respect to sharing economy workers, it is possible 
that this new deduction may make independent contractor classifi cation attractive or at least 
more palatable for some workers depending on their overall work and benefi ts situation. 
 There are a number of different, but related, tests for determining appropriate worker classifi ca-
tion, depending on the legal context. 15 For tax purposes, the IRS has developed a 20- factor test for 
distinguishing independent contractors from employees. 16 The factors examined include behav-
ioral control (i.e., whether the company controls what work the worker does and how she does the 
work) and fi nancial control (i.e., whether the company controls the business aspects of the job, 
such as what tools are used and how the worker is paid) as well as the type of relationship between 
the company and the worker (e.g., whether there are pensions, vacations, or insurance). 17 In gen-
eral, a worker will be classifi ed as an independent contractor if the paying platform has the right 
to control and direct only the  result of the work and not what and how it will be done. 
 As of this writing, key class action lawsuits have been brought by Uber and Lyft drivers, many 
of which remain unresolved. 18 Plaintiffs have confronted signifi cant litigation risks, most per-
tinently the effects of binding arbitration clauses that require disputes to be settled before arbi-
tration tribunals rather than as class actions. 19 In the meantime, many sharing economy fi rms 
have persisted in classifying their workers as independent contractors for tax and other purposes, 
issuing them yearly IRS Forms 1099 at tax time. As one of us has argued, the tax position taken by 
 12  See I.R.C. § 6654(a), (d);  see also Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax , I.R.S. Publ’n No. 505 (2018). According to the 
IRS Publication 505, taxpayers generally must pay estimated taxes for 2018 if they (1) “expect to owe at least $1,000 in 
tax for 2018” and (2) expect their withholding and refundable credits to be less than the smaller of “90% of the tax to 
be shown” on the 2018 return or “100% of the tax shown on” the 2017 tax return.  Id . at 22. 
 13  I.R.C. § 62(a)(2). 
 14  See I.R.C. § 3301–3311. 
 15  Tests applied include the common law agency test, the economic realities test, and the so- called ABC test applied by 
states.  See, e.g.,  Robert L.  Redfearn III,  Sharing Economy Misclassifi cation: Employees and Independent Contractors 
in Transportation Network Companies ,  31  Berkeley Tech. L.J.  1023 ( 2016 ) ;  Brishen  Rogers ,  Employment Rights in the 
Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics ,  10  Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev .  480 ,  487 n. 48 ( 2016 ) . 
 16  See, e.g. ,  Schramm v.  Comm’r , 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 223 (2011);  Levine v.  Comm’r , T.C.M. (RIA) 2005– 86 (2005); Rev. 
Rul. 87– 41, 1987– 1 C.B. 296. 
 17  Independent Contractor (Self- Employed) or Employee? , IRS,  www.irs.gov/ businesses/ small- businesses- self- employed/ 
independent- contractor- self- employed- or- employee (last updated Apr. 18, 2017). 
 18  See, e.g. ,  Yucesoy v.  Uber Techs., Inc. , No. C- 15– 0262 EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98515 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2015); 
 O’Connor v.  Uber Techs., Inc. , No. C- 13– 3826 EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116482 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015);  Del Rio 
v.  Uber Techs., Inc. , No. 15- cv- 03667- EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016);  Lavitman v.  Uber 
Techs., Inc. , 32 Mass. L. Rep. 476 (2015);  Cotter v.  Lyft, Inc. , No. 13- cv- 04065- VC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38256 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 16, 2017) (fi nal settlement approved);  Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc ., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(upholding Uber arbitration clause). 
 19  On November 21, 2016, in light of a 9th Circuit decision holding that the arbitration clauses entered into by drivers 
were enforceable, the California District Court stayed fi ve related litigations pending appeals.  O’Conner v.  Uber and 
related cases,  Order re Stays , No. 3:13- cv- 03826- EMC, Docket No. 769 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016). 
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the sharing economy fi rms is clearly chosen in order to be consistent – and indeed to advance – 
the desired independent contractor treatment of workers in other legal areas. 20 In light of this 
choice by the sharing economy fi rms, the remainder of this discussion discusses the tax law and 
compliance implications that arise should sharing economy workers continue to be classifi ed as 
independent contractors for tax purposes. 
 II  The Tax Law of the Sharing Economy 
 We have argued in prior scholarship that the doctrinal tax issues concerning taxation of the 
sharing economy are relatively uncontroversial. However, the law itself may be quite complex. 
And that complexity may pose tax compliance challenges for sharing economy participants. 21 
 A  Income Inclusions 
 The substantive income tax laws that apply to sharing economy participants are not unlike those 
that apply to other unincorporated sole proprietors independently operating a small business. 
These individuals must include amounts earned (such as gross fares, rents, and other payments) 
in their gross income for tax purposes. 22 They must also include in gross income any other 
payments received from the platform, such as driver referral bonuses in the case of TNCs, as 
well as tips. These receipts are includible in income for tax purposes, whether or not the worker 
actually receives a Form 1099 statement from the platform. 
 Most sharing economy participants will report income received from work performed (and 
deduct expenses) on Schedule C of Form 1040, Profi t or Loss from Business. (In this regard, 
some sharing economy participants may be surprised to discover that they must fi le taxes just like 
any other individual small business entrepreneur.) 23 Those who rent out homes or apartments 
on a platform such as Airbnb will usually report rental income on Schedule E, Supplemental 
Income and Loss from real estate and other sources, or Schedule C. 24 
 B  Deductible Expenses 
 While income receipts must be included in federal gross income, workers may deduct allowable 
business expenses on their tax return. The key issue that is likely to arise for those operating in 
the sharing economy is the need to apportion expenses between business and personal use. This 
is because the paradigmatic sharing economy operator is likely to operate part time and on more 
than one platform, and thus is likely to have property – such as a car, a home, or tools – that may 
be used sometimes for business purposes and sometimes for personal purposes. Business- related 
expenses are tax deductible but personal use expenses are not. 25 
 The precise rules for allocating costs between business and personal use differ depending on 
the context – for example, specifi c cost recovery rules may apply to TNC drivers driving miles 
 20  Oei,  supra  note 1 . 
 21  Can Sharing be Taxed? ,  supra  note 3 . 
 22  I.R.C. § 61. 
 23  The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers ,  supra  note 3 , at 89– 90. 
 24  It is possible that the IRS may assert that some Airbnb hosts are also providing services (e.g., breakfast) and thus are 
subject to employment taxes.  See, e.g., 10 Tax Tips for Airbnb, HomeAway & VRBO Vacation Rentals , Turbotax, 
 https:// turbotax.intuit.com/ tax- tools/ tax- tips/ Self- Employment- Taxes/ 10- Tax- Tips- for- Airbnb- - HomeAway- - - VRBO- 
Vacation- Rentals/ INF29184.html (updated for tax year 2016) (raising the possibility that hosts would owe employment 
taxes); Aimee Picchi,  Tax Tips if You Made Money Through Airbnb , Consumer Reports (Mar. 8, 2016) (same),  www 
.consumerreports.org/ taxes/ tax- tips- if- you- made- money- through- airbnb/ . 
 25  I.R.C. §§ 162, 262. 
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for work, landlords renting out property on Airbnb that is also subject to frequent personal use, 
or other types of sharing economy work. 
 1  TNC Drivers 
 Those driving for TNCs may recover costs for miles driven for work. In determining how to 
recover such costs, TNC drivers may choose between using the actual costs method or the 
standard mileage method. 26 The actual costs method allows the driver to deduct the actual 
expenses incurred in driving for a platform. Covered expenses include: vehicle depreciation, 
garage rent, gas, insurance, lease payments, licensing fees, oil, parking fees, registration, repairs, 
tires, and tolls. If there is both business and personal use of the vehicle, then the driver must 
allocate these expenses between the business and personal use. This may be done based on 
miles driven, such that only the portion of expenses associated with work- related miles may be 
deducted. 27 The driver is therefore required to track the number of miles driven and to docu-
ment the miles that relate to driving for a TNC. 
 Alternatively, the standard mileage method allows the driver to deduct a certain amount per 
mile driven – that rate was 54.5 cents per mile for 2018. 28 Drivers who use this method must also 
keep track of the miles driven for the TNC. A driver who chooses the standard mileage rate may 
not deduct actual expenses relating to the car (such as car lease payments, maintenance, repairs, 
and gasoline). However, that driver may deduct non- automobile costs (e.g., water or candy bars 
provided to passengers) incurred in providing the transportation service. 
 The important point, with respect to tax compliance, is that whether the driver uses the 
standard mileage rate or the actual costs method, the driver must keep track of miles driven in 
order to properly allocate expenses between business (deductible) and personal (non- deductible) 
uses. The need to accurately track business and personal expenses may raise compliance costs 
for those driving on TNC platforms. 
 2  Home- sharing 
 The home- sharing context presents a different but related set of issues from the TNC industry. 
Here, the potential application of Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code is the primary 
focus for taxpayers. Section 280A limits the deductions allowable with respect to property used 
in part for personal use and in part for business use. If there is no personal use of the property – 
such as would be the case with respect to a property rented full time – then Section 280A would 
not apply. The sharing economy context (which often implicates excess- capacity business use of 
personal assets) raises the likelihood that the property being rented is of mixed use. 
 The Section 280A rules are complex, and are only briefl y summarized here. First, as a 
threshold matter, a taxpayer may be able to avoid the application of Section 280A if the portion 
of the unit being rented qualifi es as a hotel, motel, or similar establishment  – even though 
this unit is in the taxpayer’s home. 29 This exception seeks to allow taxpayers who are renting a 
portion of their home on a regular basis to paying customers (and who do not personally use 
that portion of the unit), to avoid the otherwise applicable Section 280A limits on rental expense 
 26  See Treas. Reg. §1.274– 5(j)(2) (2000); I.R.S. Notice 2014– 79, 2014– 53, I.R.B. 1001, § 3; I.R.S. News Release IR- 2014– 114 
(Dec. 10, 2014). 
 27  See Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses , I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, 16– 17 (2018). 
 28  Id. at 16; I.R.S. News Release IR- 2017–204 (Dec. 14, 2017). There are some circumstances under which the standard 
mileage rate cannot be used. 
 29  I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(B). 
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deductions. 30 However, it seems unlikely that many properties rented through sharing economy 
platforms would qualify for this hotel exception. 
 If the taxpayer rents a dwelling unit (e.g., a house, apartment, condominium unit, mobile 
home, boat, etc.) and uses the property personally, but  not as his or her “residence,” then under 
Section 280A the taxpayer can take deductions based on the number of days rented compared to 
total number of days used. 31 This outcome is generally preferable to the more restrictive Section 
280A deduction rules (described below) that apply to rental of units that qualify as a “residence” 
of the taxpayer. 32 Personal use will rise to the level of a residence if the use is for: (1) more than 
14 days; or (2) 10 percent of the number of days for which the unit is rented at fair value. 33 Thus, 
for example, if a taxpayer owns a condominium and rents it out most of the year, but personally 
uses it for only fi ve days during the year, then that use does not rise to the level of a residence, 
and the taxpayer should be entitled to deduct expenses under this more taxpayer- friendly rule. 
 If, however, the taxpayer rents a property that he or she uses in a manner that does rise to the 
level of a “residence,” then the tax consequences depend on the number of days the property is 
rented. If the property is rented out for fewer than 15 days, then income need not be reported and 
deductions correspondingly may not be taken on the rental activity. 34 If the property is rented 
for 15 days or more, then the taxpayers may only take deductions based on a statutory allocation 
formula that is more limiting than that used for the rental of units not qualifying as a residence 
(but for which there has been some personal use). 35 
 In short, the Section 280A rules for allocation of rental deductions are complex, and are 
more so in situations in which the property rented is a dwelling unit that is used as a resi-
dence. Evolving local regulation governing rental of properties on platforms such as Airbnb 
may increase the likelihood that taxpayers will be taxed under the Section 280A rules for rental 
of residences. For example, as local jurisdictions impose limits on the number of days a prop-
erty may be rented on platforms such as Airbnb, the result may be more hosts renting property 
deemed “residential,” who are then subject to the most restrictive and confusing Section 280A 
rules for deducting rental expenses. 
 3  Other Sharing Economy Work 
 Sharing economy work is not limited to home rentals and driving for TNCs. There is now an 
extensive array of online platforms that enable the provision of a wide variety of goods and ser-
vices. Examples range from TaskRabbit 36 (assorted services) to Rover 37 (petsitting) to Fon (wifi ). 38 
In all of these contexts, microbusiness operators who earn income and incur related expenses 
must keep track of their expenses and must pay particular attention to how to distinguish between 
personal expenses (which are generally not deductible) and those incurred for business (which 
are generally deductible). To the extent that the sharing economy business model involves use of 
the taxpayer’s home or vehicle in the provision of services, the specifi c rules discussed above may 
 30  Taxpayers renting a dwelling unit (defi ned to include basic living accommodations such as “sleeping space, a toilet, 
and cooking facilities”) are not covered by the hotel exception, which envisions rental of a room in the home “that is 
always available for short- term paying customers.”  Residential Rental Property , IRS Publ’n No. 527, 17 (2018). 
 31  I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1). 
 32  I.R.C. § 280A(e)(1). 
 33  I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1). 
 34  I.R.C. §§ 280A(c)(5), (g). 
 35  I.R.C. §§ 280A(c)(5), (e)(1). 
 36  www.taskrabbit.com/ . 
 37  www.rover.com . 
 38  https:// network.fon.com/ . 
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apply. More generally, where sharing economy participants employ otherwise personal assets in 
the performance of platform work, the mixed character of the asset use increases the complexity 
of the tax analysis and correspondingly increases the compliance burden on the taxpayer. 
 III  Compliance and Classification Challenges in the Sharing Economy 
 As  Section II demonstrates, the fundamental substantive questions of how to tax income and 
allow expenses from sharing economy work are generally answered by existing law. On balance, 
existing tax rules that apply to all trades or businesses adequately describe the taxable income 
and expenses of sharing economy participants. But that conclusion does not mean that the 
existing tax regime is simple, intuitive, or streamlined for these workers. Rather, it is likely that 
workers will face documentation burdens, unexpected requirements, and some confusion. In 
response to these problems, a number of tax reforms have been recommended, both by us and 
by others, to tackle the more pressing tax challenges facing sharing economy workers. This 
section fi rst explores tax compliance realities that confront workers. It then considers the via-
bility of various tax reforms and the degree to which they would solve the problems identifi ed. 
 A  Tax Compliance Realities for Sharing Economy Workers 
 To the extent sharing economy workers are classifi ed as independent contractors (the pos-
ition adopted by most platforms), they will face both documentation burdens and compliance 
obligations that may be entirely unfamiliar. Effectively, the tax system considers such workers to 
be “in business” and, as such, they are responsible for their own employment taxes, and perhaps 
more unexpectedly, for their own quarterly payment of estimated taxes. 39 
 1  Understanding Form 1099- K 
 The two key items that workers must report from their sharing work are their income items and 
their expenses. Income is generally not diffi cult to determine in the abstract, but in some cases 
confusion over the income amount has arisen due to the documentation issued by the platform. 
Sharing businesses generally send a Form 1099- K to workers listing their income. 40 However, 
our research on TNC drivers suggests that some workers may misunderstand the numbers being 
reported. The Form 1099- K reported the  gross amount generated by the worker. In the case 
of Uber drivers, this includes the basic fare charged to the passenger, the “safe rides” fee also 
charged by Uber to passengers, and the fees and commissions that Uber charges to the driver. 41 
In the case of Lyft, the gross income amount on Form 1099- K includes the Lyft commission and 
tolls, but not certain other service fees, third- party fees, and taxes. 42 Workers are permitted to 
deduct the latter two amounts (the safe rides fee and Uber’s cut), as these amounts are actually 
retained by Uber not the driver. However, there is some risk that some drivers might not under-
stand that the Form 1099- K income number refl ects the gross amount they received from Uber 
(inclusive of Uber’s cut) and might thus fail to deduct the safe rides fee and Uber’s commission 
before reporting their taxable income. 43 Although some drivers have sought to educate others 
 39  See supra notes  8 ,  12 and accompanying text. 
 40  For a detailed discussion of the different Forms 1099 that might apply and the issues and gaps created under current 
law,  see Can Sharing Be Taxed? ,  supra  note 3 , at 1034– 41. 
 41  See, e.g. ,  How to Use your Uber 1099- K and 1099- Misc , Stride,  https:// perma.cc/ LGA8- JZ4U ;  Uber Partner Reporting 
Guide , H&R Block,  https:// perma.cc/ 6YE4- 475Z . 
 42  See 2016 Tax Info for Drivers , Lyft,  https:// perma.cc/ BU7R- F5GM . 
 43  See The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers ,  supra  note 3 , at 86– 87. 
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on the correct reading of the Form 1099- K in various internet forums, the extent to which this 
continues to be a problem in the TNC sector and the degree to which the problem arises with 
other platforms and their workers remains unclear. 
 2  Expenses: Tracking and Documentation 
 A second compliance challenge concerns deductibility of expenses. Sharing economy 
participants whose work requires them either to use valuable personal assets in the performance 
of the task or to spend their own money in the performance of their services will want to deduct 
these costs. Beyond learning the substantive tax law detailing which expenses are deductible and 
how they are calculated, workers must: (1) calculate the quantity of business use versus personal 
use (which may involve making legal determinations regarding what counts as business use); 
(2) document that use; and (3) maintain records of their expenditures. 
 Thus, for example, TNC drivers must determine how many miles driven are for personal 
use, and how many are for business. This demands at the outset a legal conclusion as to what 
driving counts for business. The answer is easy when passengers are in the car, but is less clear 
when drivers are driving from home to their main pick- up location without a passenger, driving 
home without a passenger but with the TNC App on (evidencing willingness to pick up a fare), 
or running personal errands in between rides. In addition, once the threshold legal determin-
ation is made, TNC drivers must undertake the administrative task of keeping track of business 
versus personal miles driven. This is by no means a trivial task, given that platforms such as Uber 
only record miles driven with passengers in the vehicle, and do not include other miles that 
may potentially count as business miles, such as miles driven with the App on while looking for 
passengers but without an actual passenger in the car. Thus, the mileage total obtained from 
the TNC company understates business mileage for tax purposes, and drivers must do their own 
recording and documentation. In order to do this effectively, drivers have experimented with 
phone applications and with various electronic ledgers that help track and record mileage, but 
there is some uncertainty as to what types of documentation the IRS will deem acceptable. 44 
Our research suggests that some drivers may not have been aware at the outset of the importance 
of recording mileage, or may have failed to appreciate that expense tracking and documentation 
is required (and that rough estimates are not acceptable). 
 3  Estimated and Quarterly Tax Payments 
 Sharing economy participants who are new to independent contractor status may also fail 
to realize that they likely have an obligation to fi le and pay estimated taxes during the year, 
and that their tax burden includes all components of the employment taxes. Briefl y, quarterly 
estimated tax payments are required for taxpayers for whom amounts withheld and paid to the 
IRS throughout the year will be insuffi cient when compared with the eventual assessed tax 
liability. 45 Insuffi cient withholding becomes a possibility where the worker is self- employed and 
hence not subject to employer withholding – as is the case for most sharing economy workers. 
Although some workers may be able to avoid estimated tax fi ling burdens and liabilities by 
increasing withholding from W- 2 jobs, others will not be able to avoid these obligations. 
 Sharing economy participants who are subject to estimated tax obligations must not only under-
take the administrative burden of accurately computing and paying over such taxes. They must also 
make decisions about how much to set aside to meet estimated tax obligations. If they fail to meet 
 44  Id. at 84– 86. 
 45  See ,  supra  note 12 ;  see also Estimated Taxes , IRS,  www.irs.gov/ businesses/ small- businesses- self- employed/ estimated- 
taxes (last updated Apr. 26, 2018). 
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estimated tax obligations, they will have to pay interest and penalties due to their failure to fi le. 
These administrative and substantive obligations may result in consumption shocks to taxpayers 
who may not be fi nancially savvy enough to appropriately allocate funds and manage fi nances. 
 4  Tax Law’s Impact on Labor Supply Choices of Sharing Economy Workers 
 Beyond compliance burdens, the structure and administration of the tax system can impact the 
labor decisions of sharing economy workers. Some of these impacts may result from misinfor-
mation or lack of clarity, which may raise troubling questions. 
 First, and perhaps most importantly, workers may experience an effect known as “spotlighting.” 
This term captures circumstances in which workers do not accurately know the costs of under-
taking sharing economy work, and therefore overestimate the net benefi ts of such work and risk 
oversupplying labor. Taxation of sharing economy work may potentially cause spotlighting on 
payments received from the platform for sharing economy work. For example, a TNC driver may 
receive these payments well in advance of having to take into account the expenses (including 
vehicle wear and tear) from driving and the taxes owed, which may cause her to overestimate 
the return on her labor. Taxation may exacerbate these effects, because tax fi ling (aside from 
estimated taxes) occurs on an annual basis, after the fact. 
 Another possibility is that workers may focus on average tax rates rather than marginal tax 
rates when deciding how much to work in the sharing economy. This may occur, for instance, 
where workers “just guesstimate” what their year- end tax liability is likely to be. “Guesstimating” 
may be a particular risk when the worker faces multiple tax rate schedules – for example, state 
and federal taxes – and may be compounded where the worker has more than one job, or does 
sharing economy work on top of a regular job. Such workers may not have a clear idea of what 
their eventual income bracket (and hence tax liability) is likely to be, and this may cause them 
to supply labor at a higher than optimal level. 
 In short, taxation is distortionary, and one possible margin of distortion regards how much 
workers decide to work. Due to the realities of the annual tax year, the lack of withholding 
on amounts paid to Form 1099- K workers, and the fragmented nature of work in the sharing 
economy, workers may be particularly likely to experience challenges in determining how much 
they are making and how much they should work. 
 The overall burden for sharing economy workers of learning to read a Form 1099- K, learning 
the substantive tax law governing deductions, allocating expenses between business and 
personal use, tracking and documenting business use and actual expenses, and managing quar-
terly estimated tax fi lings can seem signifi cant. This assessment may be particularly true for 
those workers who are not familiar with taxation of small businesses (e.g., fi rst- time independent 
contractors), who are pursuing sharing economy work on a part- time or short- term basis, or who 
earn relatively little compared to the costs of compliance (including securing competent tax 
return advice). 
 B  Is Employee Classifi cation a Tax Solution? 
 Is the signifi cant administrative and compliance burden on sharing economy “micro-
entrepreneurs” a problem that warrants legal reform? On the one hand, these tax compliance 
obligations are not new and have long been in place for self- employed individuals engaged 
in trade or business. Thus, it would seem that any suggestion that reform is needed ought to 
take into account burdens of the tax compliance regime on sole proprietors generally, not just 
sharing economy workers. On the other hand, there is a non- trivial risk that even if these tax 
compliance burdens are not excessive for self- employed individuals engaged in more traditional 
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businesses, these burdens may not scale down appropriately for “microbusiness” individuals – 
that is, individuals engaged in business on a very small scale, for whom compliance burdens 
may outstrip any benefi t to be gained from occasional platform work. 
 One possible way in which compliance burdens on sharing economy workers might be 
mitigated is if workers were classifi ed as employees rather than independent contractors. 
Employee classifi cation would result in sharing economy workers receiving Form W- 2 instead 
of Form 1099- K, and would at least alleviate the compliance burdens associated with having to 
fi le quarterly estimated taxes and social security taxes. Employee status for sharing economy 
workers has been advocated by various actors, both as a conclusion of fact under existing law, 
and as a normatively desirable legal policy. However, the primary driver for such advocacy has 
been labor law and related worker protection issues, not tax law. 
 Yet, even if employee classifi cation might yield labor law and worker protection benefi ts, it is 
not clear that such classifi cation would uniformly yield positive impacts for workers with respect 
to tax. Three distinct points highlight the tax risks of classifi cation as an employee. 
 First, documentation and compliance burdens might remain high. Take, for example, TNC 
drivers:  assuming that after being classifi ed as employees, drivers continued to conduct their 
operations as before –  continuing to use their personal vehicle for driving and to incur passenger- 
related costs (such as insurance, water, etc.) – these taxpayers would still need to determine the 
business– personal split of their miles driven, appropriately record their miles, determine which 
costs are deductible and how, and maintain proper documentation of the outlays for which a 
deduction would be sought. This is the case for two reasons. First, if the employee would like to 
take a tax deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses, these documentation and compliance 
requirements remain. Second, the documentation and tracking burdens also exist if the worker is 
seeking reimbursement from her employer (for example, if the employer is required to bear worker 
expenses under certain state laws). 46 To be sure, some burdens would be lifted, in particular the 
obligation to fi le quarterly and ensuring that appropriate taxes had been paid during the course of 
the year, as this task would be taken on by the employer, the ride- sharing company. It is also pos-
sible that some of the salience- related effects on labor supply decisions may be improved. 
 Second, and related to the fi rst point, the shift to employee status alone, without any 
corresponding change in the fundamental business model of TNC platforms, would mean that 
drivers would continue to bear signifi cant work- related costs. 47 Not only would the tax burdens 
related to monitoring these costs continue, but the tax benefi t from having made these outlays will 
disappear due to a new tax provision (Section 67(g)) enacted in December 2017. Even without 
this new rule, employees were more limited than independent contractors in their ability to 
deduct business expenses. Independent contractors must satisfy the core Section 162 test that the 
expense “be ordinary and necessary” in order to be deductible, and they must meet any additional 
limitations imposed by Section 274 (intended to help police the business/ personal line and other-
wise prevent abuse). 48 However, once those hurdles are met, independent contractors may deduct 
those expenses without further limitation. 
 By contrast, up through December 2017, employees who incurred identical business costs in 
the performance of the same function were subject to a further tax limitation. In their cases, 
 46  See infra  note 46 . 
 47  There may be some exceptions to this on a state- by- state basis, where for example, state labor law requires the 
employer to reimburse an employee for certain signifi cant expenses borne by the employee. In such cases, by oper-
ation of law the employee would no longer bear such costs even though the business model had not been formally 
renegotiated with the employer.  See, e.g. , Cal. Labor Code § 2802. 
 48  In some circumstances, special rules may govern certain types of outlays, such as Section 195 (startup costs). 
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the deductions were taken “below the line,” meaning that they were subject to Section 67 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, which allowed the deduction of expenses incurred by employees 
in the “trade or business of being an employee” only to the extent that these outlays (along with 
some others) in aggregate exceeded 2 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 49 If those 
substantive tax law provisions governing employee expenses had remained in place, the shift to 
employee status would result in the loss of tax deductions for sharing economy workers who pro-
vide personal assets to use in their work and who incur signifi cant unreimbursed costs in the con-
text of their sharing economy work. 50 However, new Section 67(g) (introduced in the December 
2017 tax reform) suspends any deduction of these trade or business expenses by employees for 
taxable years beginning before January 1, 2026.  Thus, until 2026, being classifi ed as an employee 
means a complete loss of tax deductions for these expenses, rather than merely a “haircut.” 
 Third, the introduction of the new deduction in Section 199A for passthrough businesses 
including independent contractors (but not employees) creates a further tax wedge between the 
two worker classifi cations. Classifi cation as an employee requires a taxpayer to sacrifi ce access to 
the new 20 percent deduction. Many sharing economy businesses clearly consider independent 
contractor classifi cation for workers to be the desired classifi cation for their business model. Many 
have advocated for independent contractor treatment for workers through litigation, through 
regulatory fi lings, and through the ways they talk about and market their business models. 51 
Presumably, this refl ects an assessment that this classifi cation is most advantageous in terms of 
the business’s own profi tability (savings in taxes and benefi ts) and business risk (e.g. tort liability). 
 C  Other Possible Fixes? 
 Worker reclassifi cation aside, are there other possibilities for reform? Some commentators have 
suggested maybe so. Although some of the challenges raised by the sharing economy arise on 
the side of administration and enforcement for the taxing authority, 52 many of the key compli-
ance and related challenges are those confronting workers. There are several possibilities for 
alleviating these challenges. However, there are also risks inherent in each of these possibilities. 
Most pertinently, each of these fi xes and recommendations developed within the tax context 
 49  I.R.C. § 67. 
 50  The tax rules in place through December 2017 are captured by the following simplifi ed example. Imagine a 
worker who earns $10,000 in gross income from sharing economy work and $45,000 from other employment, 
and spends $2,000 on qualifi ed business expenses in the conduct of the sharing economy work. If the worker is 
classifi ed as an independent contractor with respect to the sharing economy work, the $2,000 of expenses will 
be considered “above the line” expenses under Section 62. Such above- the- line expenses may be fully deducted 
in arriving at the taxpayer’s “adjusted gross income,” which would be $53,000, and will accordingly reduce the 
taxpayer’s taxable income by a full $2,000. In contrast, if the worker is classifi ed as an employee with respect to 
the sharing economy work, the $2,000 of employee expenses will be miscellaneous itemized deductions under 
Section 67 (because Section 62 excludes employee expenses), and will be disallowed to the extent they do not 
exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. In this case, the worker’s adjusted gross income remains 
at $55,000. Two percent of adjusted gross income is $1,100. Thus, the taxpayer will only be permitted to deduct 
$900 out of the $2,000 expenses incurred from her $55,000 of adjusted gross income. The taxpayer will not be 
able to deduct anywhere on her tax return the remaining $1,100 spent. 
 51  Oei,  supra  note 1 (discussing sharing economy fi rm strategies for advocating for “gig” classifi cation);  see also Francine 
McKenna,  Uber Believes it has SEC Nod for Earnings Approach that Mirrors Business Model , Marketwatch (Oct. 
26, 2017),  www.marketwatch.com/ story/ uber- an- early- adopter- of- new- revenue- recognition- rules- believes- it- has- secs- 
blessing- of- its- business- model- 2017- 10- 25?mg=prod/ accounts- mw (noting that Uber is taking the position for SEC 
fi ling purposes that its customers are the drivers, not the passengers). 
 52  We discuss these and potential solutions to tax administration diffi culties in  Can Sharing be Taxed? ,  supra  note 3 . 
They will not be further discussed here. 
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could, if pursued, have implications for legal outcomes in other fi elds, and some of these effects 
could be costly. 
 For example, Congress could enact safe harbors for expense deductions (akin to the standard 
mileage rate currently in place for miles driven on business), to obviate the need for detailed 
expense allocation and tracking. One concrete proposal along these lines comes from Prof. 
Kathleen Thomas in the form of a “standard business deduction” for sharing economy workers, 
which would allow workers to deduct a certain preset amount (computed as a percentage of 
total gross receipts) and would eliminate the need for workers to document and track expenses 
throughout the year. 53 Such an approach might raise other issues, including the problem of 
deciding who should be eligible to take the deduction, and the level at which the deduction 
should be set. However, it would certainly alleviate the compliance, documentation, and 
expense- tracking burdens that currently confront workers engaged in microbusiness, and may 
make particular sense in a sector where the compliance and documentation costs might far 
outweigh the amounts actually earned. The bigger risk is that creating a simplifi ed tax regime 
for sharing economy workers might represent a piecemeal approach to ameliorating challenges 
confronted by these workers at the expense of more comprehensive protections. Simplifi ed 
regimes may obscure the (plausible) argument that independent contractor classifi cation is 
a poor fi t for sharing economy workers by allowing fi rms to claim that operating as an inde-
pendent contractor in this sector is now “easy.” 
 Another direct way to alleviate some worker compliance burdens is to clarify for platforms 
what payments need to be reported. Specifi cally, one challenge that has confronted a subset of 
sharing economy participants arises in the event the worker does not receive a Form 1099 from 
the platform. The rule is that even if an amount paid is not reported on Form 1099, it must still 
be included in the recipient’s gross income. Thus, if a worker does not receive a Form 1099, she 
will be faced with the burden of totaling up amounts earned throughout the year for purposes 
of income inclusion. Nonissuance of a Form 1099 may occur, for example, in cases where the 
platform claims that it need not issue Form 1099 because the amount earned does not meet the 
appropriate threshold for Form 1099 issuance (such as the 200 transaction/ $20,000 threshold 
under the regulations governing issuance of Form 1099- K). 54 As we have discussed in prior work, 
there is some ambiguity regarding whether this threshold in fact applies to sharing economy 
work. 55 A simple way of alleviating the compliance burden on workers would be for the IRS to 
clarify that issuance of a Form 1099 is required at all income levels. 
 Even a worker who has received a Form 1099 may be unprepared to complete her tax return 
accurately. As noted earlier, some workers have been confused regarding the numbers reported 
on the Form 1099 and have not appreciated that the numbers are gross numbers (and not 
net of the various platform fees and the cut owed to the platform). This confusion could be 
mitigated either by clearer instructions issued by the platform accompanying the Form 1099, or 
by redesign of the form itself by the IRS (such redesign could highlight the difference between 
gross and net, and better guide the worker to reporting the proper numbers in the proper places 
on Schedule C). 
 As noted above, the structures and realities of tax compliance may have impacts on the 
behaviors of taxpayers operating in the sharing economy. In particular, the lack of withholding on 
 53  Thomas,  supra  note 3 . 
 54  Can Sharing Be Taxed? ,  supra  note 3 , at 1031– 41 (discussing the Form 1099- K reporting positions taken by various 
platforms and the potential compliance effects of these positions). 
 55  Id. 
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independent contractor payments may both increase compliance burdens on sharing economy 
operators and may distort their labor supply choices. A possible reform that may alleviate these 
effects would be to require tax withholding on certain non- employee payments. Along these 
lines, Professor Thomas has suggested that non- employee withholding for sharing economy 
workers might be imposed up front for just these reasons. 56 Such up- front wage withholding – if 
properly designed – would alleviate estimated tax burdens and would allow workers to more 
accurately understand how much of a tax burden they are likely to experience on the back end, 
and to make decisions accordingly. But again, the risk is that these types of piecemeal reforms 
in one arena (tax) may undercut movement in favor of more comprehensive protections for 
workers across other fi elds. 
 Finally, the importance of taxpayer education cannot be overstated. The sharing economy is 
an emerging sector that has drawn in many new participants. Some of these new workers might 
not understand that they are required to report income, or how they are supposed to report 
income. Others may experience confusion regarding which expenses to track, or how to track 
them. In prior work, we have suggested some ways in which such taxpayer education about tax 
compliance obligations may be accomplished. At the time of writing, the IRS, in partnership 
with the National Taxpayer Advocate, has launched a Sharing Economy Tax Center, a website 
containing resources for workers and platforms operating in the sharing economy. 57 That web-
site includes a number of resources and links that inform those working in the sharing economy 
of their tax obligations and help them meet those obligations. This is a good start; however, 
more could be done to educate taxpayers on tax compliance obligations, even as measures are 
considered to alleviate these obligations. 
 Each of these fi xes and recommendations developed within the tax context could, if pursued, 
have implications for legal outcomes in other fi elds. 
 Conclusion 
 The phenomenon of work in the sharing economy has generated notable discussion and debate. 
Much of that discussion has focused on worker protections such as collective bargaining, frag-
mentation of the labor market, and undercutting of traditional industries. However, tax issues 
also play an important part in the ultimate experience of sharing economy workers, though the 
role of tax has attracted relatively little notice so far. The individual who performs work in the 
sector through the new technology platforms will be forced to confront the realities of tax com-
pliance and reporting in due course. Thus, the tax design choices we make may help encourage 
work in the sharing economy or, alternatively, may act as a brake on that sector’s development. 
Moreover, we should expect that the design choices we make with respect to the tax treatment 
of sharing economy workers will inevitably have impacts on and spillovers into the labor law and 
broader worker protection conversation. Policymakers should therefore give serious attention to 
the tax system’s impacts on microbusiness. 
 56  Thomas,  supra  note 3 . 
 57  Sharing Economy Tax Center , IRS,  www.irs.gov/ businesses/ small- businesses- self- employed/ sharing- economy- tax- 
center (last updated Feb 2, 2018). 
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